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ment before appealing, however, a favorable ruling would be purely aca-
demic.4
To avoid such harsh consequences arising from various types of rul-
ings, both Congress and the Supreme Court have carved out exceptions to 
this “final decision rule.”5 The collateral order doctrine is the most preva-
lent of these exceptions, and it interprets certain interlocutory orders as 
“final” for purposes of appeal.6 These orders generally must conclusively 
determine an issue that is distinct from the merits of the central claim, and 
that would be mooted post-judgment.7
Over time, the Supreme Court has both broadened and narrowed each 
of these requirements for collaterally appealable orders, and the resulting 
complexity of the doctrinal framework has made consistent application 
difficult for lower courts.8 Consequently, there has been a drastic increase 
in purely procedural litigation.9 As these cases have risen to the federal 
courts of appeals, various circuits have reached divergent conclusions on 
whether to grant appellate jurisdiction for several classes of rulings. Cur-
rently, the federal circuits are split regarding whether collateral order ap-
peal is appropriate for denials of appointed counsel in civil rights cases, 
denials of Parker immunity claims, temporary reinstatement orders for 
miners pursuing claims against their employers, and resolutions of motions 
to strike under anti-SLAPP statutes.10
In response to concerns over increasing caseloads in the federal courts, 
Congress commissioned a Federal Courts Study Committee to research the 
issue in 1988.11 The Committee Report cited both the final decision rule 
and the collateral order doctrine as “unsatisfactory” because litigants re-
mained unclear on when an order was appealable.12 To remedy this, the 
Committee recommended that Congress grant the Court rulemaking author-
ity to define both when a ruling is final for purposes of appeal and when 
otherwise non-final rulings are appealable.13 Congress complied and grant-
4. See generally Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951) (allowing immediate appeal from denials of 
motions to reduce bail). 
5. ALEX KOZINSKI & JOHN K. RABIEJ, FEDERAL APPELLATE PROCEDURE MANUAL 19–37
(2014).
6. Id. at 19.
7. Id. at 19–20.
8. See discussion infra Part II. 
9. Federal Courts Study Comm., Judicial Conference of the U.S., Report of the Federal Courts 
Study Committee 95 (1990) [hereinafter Report].
10. See discussion infra Part III. 
11. Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-702, 102 Stat. 
4642 (1988) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
12. Report, supra note 9, at 95.
13. Id. at 95–96.
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ed the Court this authority soon after, but the Court has used these powers 
only once.14
To address the increased litigation and inconsistent applications by 
lower courts, the Court should again use its rulemaking authority granted to 
it by Congress—authority that allows the Court to re-articulate require-
ments for collateral order appeal and eliminate the various interpretations 
courts employ. With respect to important, previously appealable classes of 
orders excluded by the new requirements for collateral order finality, the 
Court can codify appellate jurisdiction deliberately.
Part II of this Comment discusses the final decision rule and its most 
common exception: the collateral order doctrine. It traces the Supreme 
Court’s individual development and treatment of each of the doctrine’s 
requirements, and identifies presently conflicting interpretations. It also 
discusses Congress’ grant of rulemaking authority to the Court to address 
difficulties arising from the collateral order doctrine. Part III highlights 
current circuit splits surrounding the doctrine, and subsequently analyzes 
how various federal courts of appeals have applied the requirements differ-
ently. Part IV proposes a two-step solution: first, the Court should use its 
authority to narrowly redefine the collateral order doctrine’s three require-
ments for finality; second, the Court should complement these new re-
quirements by providing for immediate appeal of certain non-final rulings.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Final Decision Rule
The U.S. Supreme Court and various federal courts of appeals gener-
ally have jurisdiction to review final decisions of lower courts.15 A final 
decision, alternatively called a final judgment, is one that fully resolves all 
claims against all parties to the lawsuit, adjudicates all issues on the merits, 
and leaves only the execution of the judgment to be completed by the lower 
court.16 This prerequisite for appellate review is aptly referred to as the 
“final judgment rule,” or “final decision rule.” The rule furthers several 
important policies, such as emphasizing deference to the authority and 
independent judgment of the lower court; avoiding the obstruction of meri-
14. Adam N. Steinman, Reinventing Appellate Jurisdiction, 48 B.C. L. REV. 1237, 1246 (2007) 
(Discussing codification of 28 U.S.C. § 2072(c) in 1990, allowing judicial rulemaking to define when a 
ruling is final for purposes of appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291; also discussing codification of 28 
U.S.C. § 1292(e) in 1992, allowing for rulemaking to provide appeal for otherwise non-final rulings, 
and the Court’s sole use of this authority to promulgate FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f)).
15. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2011); 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (2011). 
16. Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945).
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torious claims arising from the harassment and cost of successive, piece-
meal appeals; and promoting efficient judicial administration.17
Postponement of appeal promotes efficiency because it guards against 
review of an issue that may be rendered moot by a trial on the merits. In 
addition, the eventual trial may raise additional federal questions that are 
resolved more quickly when consolidated into a single appeal. Thus, post-
judgment appeals generally save time and money for both litigants and the 
court system.18
On the other hand, parties unhappy with a court’s decision made dur-
ing litigation must sometimes wait for a long time before they may appeal. 
By then, it may be too late for an appellate court to restore important rights 
a lower court wrongfully denied. For example, a litigant confronted with an 
order rejecting an asserted privilege may be forced to expose private com-
munications before receiving an opportunity to appeal that ruling.19 Such 
disclosures— erroneously compelled by the court for use at a public trial—
may result in serious personal or professional harm. In this regard, the costs 
of postponing appeal sometimes outweigh the benefits.
To address this issue, both Congress and the courts have carved out 
various exceptions to the final decision rule where undue harshness would 
otherwise result. Legislative exceptions include certain interlocutory orders 
subject to appeal either as of right or by discretion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
1292, such as rulings on injunction or difficult questions of law where sub-
stantial ground for difference of opinion exists.20 Judicially-crafted excep-
tions include grants or denials of class-action certification pursuant to the 
Supreme Court’s rulemaking authority,21 writs of mandamus for extraordi-
nary circumstances such as judicial usurpation of power,22 and the collat-
eral order doctrine.23
B. The Collateral Order Doctrine
Established by Cohen in 1949, the collateral order doctrine allows for 
appeal from a narrow category of interlocutory judgments that do not fully 
17. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 374 (1981).
18. Bryan Lammon, Rules, Standards, and Experimentation in Appellate Jurisdiction, 74 OHIO
ST. L.J. 423, 428 (2013).
19. See Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 109 (2009).
20. Kozinski & Rabiej, supra note 5, at 37; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1292, 28 U.S.C. § 1651, FED. R.
CIV. P. 54(b).
21. Kozinski & Rabiej, supra note 5, at 37.
22. Id. at 22–23.
23. Id. at 19. 
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resolve an action.24 The plaintiff in Cohen brought a stockholder’s deriva-
tive action against the corporation and several of its managers and direc-
tors.25 The defendants moved to apply a state law holding unsuccessful 
plaintiffs in such cases liable for costs and requiring them to post a bond as 
security before proceeding on the action.26 The district court denied the 
motion and the defendants immediately appealed.27 After reversal in the 
Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court granted certiorari partly on the issue 
of whether the order was immediately appealable.28
Citing its history of giving the final decision rule a “practical rather 
than a technical construction,” the Court held that 28 U.S.C. § 1291 permit-
ted immediate appeal for three principal reasons.29 First, although the cause 
of action had not been decided, this order represented final disposition of 
the security issue.30 Second, the order was separable from the merits of the 
case—that is, it did not advance any aspect of the central claim, required its 
own distinct analysis, and would not be merged in final judgment.31 Third, 
by the time a reviewing court could resolve the issue on appeal, the lower 
court would have already forced the plaintiff to post the money as a pre-
condition to the suit, and the issue would therefore be moot.32
In the years that followed, the Court failed to offer specific require-
ments for the Cohen doctrine, and instead granted jurisdiction where it 
found an order to be “too important to be denied review and too independ-
ent of the cause itself to require that appellate consideration be deferred.”33
Almost thirty years later, the Court finally took this vague standard and 
articulated three discrete elements for collateral orders which remain in use 
today in Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay.34
The Coopers & Lybrand Court held that decisions excepted from the 
final decision rule must: (1) conclusively determine the disputed question; 
(2) resolve an important issue completely separate from the merits of the 
action; and (3) be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judg-
ment.35 The Court has long held, however, that when applying this test, 
24. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 545–47 (1949).
25. Id. at 543–44.
26. Id. at 544–45.
27. See id. at 545.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 546–47.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 546.
32. See Id.
33. Lammon, supra note 18, at 448 (quoting Cohen, 337 U.S. at 546). 
34. Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468–69 (1978).
35. Id. at 468.
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courts must determine whether the type of order at issue generally meets 
these requirements in all cases rather than just in the case at hand.36 For
example, a denial of a motion to certify a case as a class action may be 
conclusively determined in a particular case, but immediate appealability of 
this type of order is inappropriate because courts often revisit the class 
certification issue as the litigation proceeds. This policy against individual-
ized jurisdictional inquiry promotes efficiency by allowing higher courts to 
establish appellate jurisdiction over entire classes of orders rather than de-
ciding each case on the merits.37
Predictably, the federal circuits have routinely disagreed about proper 
application of each of these three prongs38 because the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of the doctrine’s requirements has gradually evolved since 
Cohen.39 So, to illustrate why lower courts have applied the doctrine incon-
sistently, this section will trace each prong’s development and treatment 
individually.
1. Conclusiveness
In Cohen, the Supreme Court crafted the collateral order doctrine from 
its interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 1291, the statutory source of authority for 
the final decision rule.40 The Court determined that Congress did not intend 
the statute to apply only to decisions that terminate an action.41 Rather, the 
Cohen Court interpreted the statute to allow for appeal of any final ruling, 
and it found certain interlocutory decisions final so long as they were not 
tentative, informal, incomplete, open, unfinished, or inconclusive.42
This interpretation ostensibly instructed that rulings subject to later 
modification are not ripe for appeal under the statute. When the Court ar-
ticulated discrete requirements for collateral order appeals in Coopers & 
Lybrand, it offered similar guidance. In that case, the Court found the con-
clusiveness requirement not satisfied with respect to a denial of class certi-
fication because the order was subject to alteration or amendment before 
the decision on the merits.43
36. E.g., Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 486 U.S. 517, 529 (1988) (“In fashioning a rule of appeal-
ability under § 1291, however, we look to categories of cases, not to particular injustices.”).
37. Holmes v. Fisher, 854 F.2d 229, 231–32 (7th Cir. 1988).
38. See discussion infra part III. 
39. See discussion infra part II.B.1–3. 
40. See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 545 (1949).
41. See id.
42. Id. at 546.
43. Coopers & Lybrand, 437 U.S. at 469 n.11. 
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under the conclusiveness prong, but the Court’s guidance in those cases 
merely supplemented that of its previous cases. Accordingly, lower courts 
may reasonably decide whether an order is conclusive based on several 
considerations, including whether the entering court expects to revise the 
order later, whether subsequent revision remains possible,52 and even 
whether revision is probable.53 Perhaps one of these considerations should 
be dispositive or at least weigh more heavily than the others, but this re-
mains unclear.
2. Separability
In its interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 1291, the Cohen Court held that 
even fully consummated decisions could not be immediately appealed if 
they were “but steps toward final judgment in which they will merge.”54
The Court required that rulings be sufficiently separable from the central 
merits of the case to prevent successive, piecemeal appeals by combining 
“all stages of the proceeding that effectively may be reviewed and correct-
ed if and when final judgment results.”55
In the two and a half decades immediately following Cohen, separabil-
ity questions presented little trouble for the Court.56 For example, the Court 
in Stack v. Boyle found denial of a motion to reduce bail in a criminal case 
sufficiently distinct from the merits of the central charge.57 The Stack Court
provided little explanation for its grant of jurisdiction in this context, but a 
court can certainly resolve the issue of whether bail should be reduced in a 
case without any examination of the underlying criminal charge. In addi-
tion, resolution of the bail issue does not advance the underlying action 
toward final judgment.
In 1977, a pair of cases revealed the most debated issue surrounding 
separability: whether any overlap with the merits of the case is permissible. 
The first case, Abney v. United States, involved an order rejecting a double 
jeopardy claim.58 After being tried and convicted, an appellate court vacat-
ed the defendants’ convictions. On remand, the defendants moved to dis-
52. See infra note 161 and accompanying text.
53. See infra note 159 and accompanying text. 
54. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949).
55. Id.
56. See Parr v. United States, 351 U.S. 513, 519 (1956); Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 6 (1951); 
Swift & Co. v. Compania Caribe, 339 U.S. 684, 688–89 (1950); Roberts v. United States District Court, 
339 U.S. 844, 845 (1950).
57. See Stack, 342 U.S. at 6.
58. Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651 (1977).
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miss to avoid facing two trials for a single offense.59 In reviewing appellate 
jurisdiction over the denial of their motion, the Court determined that the 
defendants’ double jeopardy claim was separable from the central issue of 
guilt or innocence in the case because the defendants neither challenged the 
merits of the criminal charge nor sought to suppress the related evidence 
against them.60
Double jeopardy claims, however, often overlap with the merits.61 As
mentioned above, when the court confers appellate jurisdiction, it does so 
for the entire classes of orders. Thus, Abney weakened the requirement that 
the issue be completely separate from the merits of the action, at least for 
certain claims.
That same year, the Court decided National Socialist Party of America 
v. Skokie.62 In that case, the state court entered an injunction preventing a 
Nazi group from marching or otherwise displaying the swastika in public.63
Both the Illinois appellate court and Supreme Court denied the Nazis’ sub-
sequent motions to stay the injunction.64 The U.S. Supreme Court granted 
certiorari and found the denial of stay immediately appealable as a collat-
eral order.65
The Court reasoned that the Nazis would potentially be deprived of 
First Amendment rights while waiting more than a year for appellate re-
view to complete, and the state must provide strict procedural safeguards 
when seeking to impose such restrictions, including access to immediate 
appeal.66 Here again, the Court diluted Cohen’s strict separability require-
ment when it held that the issue is sufficiently separable despite immediate 
review being predicated upon a showing that the underlying First Amend-
ment claim is facially valid.67
Less than a decade later, the Court in Mitchell v. Forsyth gutted the 
separability requirement.68 The order at issue in that case was a denial of a 
59. Id. at 655.
60. Id. at 659–60.
61. Lloyd C. Anderson, The Collateral Order Doctrine: A New “Serbonian Bog” and Four 
Proposals for Reform, 46 Drake L. Rev. 539, 548–551, 557 (1998) (“For example, if the issue is wheth-
er the same conduct is the basis of both prosecutions, there may be a need to determine, based upon 
evidence presented at trial, precisely the conduct in which the defendant engaged.”).
62. Nat’l Socialist Party of Am. v. Vill. of Skokie, 432 U.S. 43 (1977).
63. Id. at 43.
64. Id. at 43–44.
65. Id. at 44. 
66. Id.
67. Anderson, supra note 61, at 559.
68. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985).
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government official’s assertion of qualified immunity.69 The applicable 
legal analysis called for a court to determine whether the defendant’s al-
leged conduct violated clearly established legal norms.70 This issue ap-
peared inextricably entangled with the merits (whether his actual conduct
violated the law).
Nevertheless, the Court sidestepped the obstacle of separability by re-
defining it to require only that the issue be “conceptually distinct.”71 The 
Mitchell Court rationalized that such overlap was acceptable because deci-
sions on other classes of immediately appealable orders, like double jeop-
ardy claims, may also require consideration of the facts of the central 
claim.72 Thus, Mitchell indicated that separability was satisfied so long as 
the issue on appeal had an identifiable difference from the merits.73
Three years later, the Court reverted to a “completely separate” stand-
ard in Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard.74 There, the Court considered whether 
denial of a motion to dismiss on the ground of forum non conveniens
should be appealable as a collateral order.75 In a drastic change of position 
on separability, the Court stated that “[a]llowing appeals from interlocutory 
orders that involve considerations enmeshed in the merits of the dispute 
would waste judicial resources by requiring repetitive appellate review of 
substantive questions in the case.”76
For example, one factor courts must examine when determining 
whether venue is appropriate under that doctrine is the ease of access to 
sources of proof. To assess this factor, a court must “scrutinize the sub-
stance of the dispute between the parties to evaluate what proof is required, 
and determine whether the pieces of evidence cited by the parties are criti-
cal, or even relevant, to the plaintiff’s cause of action and to any potential 
defenses to the action.”77 Thus, this analysis necessarily involves some 
inquiry into the facts and legal issues of the case and cannot be adequately 
separated from the merits.78
69. Id. at 515.
70. Id. at 517.
71. See id. at 527–28.
72. Id. at 528 (“To be sure, the resolution of these legal issues will entail consideration of the 
factual allegations that make up the plaintiff’s claim for relief; the same is true, however, when a court 
must consider whether a prosecution is barred by a claim of former jeopardy . . . “).
73. Anderson, supra note 61, at 574. 
74. Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 486 U.S. 517, 527–28 (1988).
75. Id. at 527.
76. Id. at 527–28.
77. Id. at 529.
78. Id.
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After Van Cauwenberghe, the Court’s only notable review of separa-
bility was in Johnson v. Jones.79 But in that case, the Court simply declined 
to find a particular determination in a lower court’s denial of summary 
judgment separable from the merits, and did not further refine the require-
ment.80 In sum, the Court’s guidance thus far indicates that considerations 
necessary to determine collaterally appealable orders may overlap with 
those necessary to determine the merits of the case, but only in certain situ-
ations. Again, the Court has not provided clear guidance on when a lower 
court must require complete separability rather than mere conceptual dis-
tinctness.
3. Importance
In addition to separability, the second prong in Coopers & Lybrand
specified that an issue must be important. Nevertheless, the Court has often 
considered this requirement as part of the unreviewability prong and has 
even suggested it as an independent, dispositive consideration.81 Accord-
ingly, a brief discussion of importance as a distinct element is warranted.
Although the Cohen opinion defined the small class of collaterally ap-
pealable orders as those “too important to be denied review,”82 courts did 
not initially require that a ruling involve a sufficiently important right. Al-
most forty years after Cohen, Justice Scalia first suggested implementation 
of the importance standard as a further limiting principle of the Court’s 
greatly expanded finality jurisprudence in his 1988 concurrence in Gulf-
stream.83 Five years later, the Court bolstered its reasoning for allowing the 
collateral order appeal of a denial of an Eleventh Amendment immunity 
claim by stating that the “ultimate justification” was the importance of the 
interests protected.84
The next year, the Court in Digital Equipment Corp. v. Desktop Di-
rect, Inc. suggested for the first time that importance alone may be a dis-
positive consideration.85 In that case, the plaintiffs argued that the lower 
court’s rescission of their settlement agreement should be immediately 
appealable because it provided immunity from trial.86 The Court disagreed, 
finding that—in contrast to a constitutional or statutory right to evade tri-
79. Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304 (1995).
80. See id. at 310–315.
81. See, e.g., Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 878–79 (1994).
82. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949).
83. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 485 U.S. 271, 291–92 (1988).
84. Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 146 (1993).
85. Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863 (1994).
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interpretation, and extended collateral order appeals only where delay 
would render post-judgment review impossible.94
In Local No. 438 Const. & Gen. Laborers’ Union, AFL-CIO v. Curry,
the Court began its expansion of the requirement. The Court allowedimme-
diate appeal of an order issuing a temporary injunction to stop union picket 
lines from forming in front of an employer.95 The issue on appeal was 
whether the state court had jurisdiction to issue the injunction, or whether 
that jurisdiction rested with the National Labor Relations Board.96 This
marked a significant departure from the Court’s previous decisions because 
here, postponement of appeal would not completely moot the issue of ju-
risdiction.97 Instead, the Court grounded its decision on the fact that delay
would have negative national labor policy implications.98 Curry thus sig-
naled a change from Cohen’s strict mootness requirement to allow for an 
alternative: broader policy considerations.
Where the Court in Curry created an alternative to the requirement of
strict unreviewability, the Court seemingly dropped the third prong entirely 
a decade later. In Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, a district court ordered the 
defendants to pay most of the cost of providing notice to potential members 
of a class action.99 Most notably, the Supreme Court held that the notice 
cost ruling was immediately appealable as a collateral order but said noth-
ing about loss of effective review after a final decision.100 The Court’s si-
lence here was striking because defendants could have appealed the issue 
after prevailing on the merits and could have obtained an order for reim-
bursement from the plaintiffs.101 Commentators have suggested this indi-
94. See generally, Anderson, supra note 61, at 548–51. See also, Parr v. United States, 351 U.S. 
513 (1956); Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951); Swift & Co. v. Compania Caribe, 339 U.S. 684 (1950); 
Roberts v. United States District Court, 339 U.S. 844 (1950).
95. Local No. 438 Const. & Gen. Laborers’ Union, AFL-CIO v. Curry, 371 U.S. 542 (1963).
96. Id. at 548.
97. Anderson, supra note 61, at 552 (“In Curry . . . if the defendants had been required to wait 
until a permanent injunction was granted, the issue whether the NLRB had jurisdiction to the exclusion 
of state courts would not have been moot; if the United States Supreme Court were to rule on appeal 
that the state courts lacked jurisdiction, the injunction would be vacated and the union would be free to 
resume picketing.”).
98. Curry, 371 U.S. at 550 (“The policy of 28 U.S.C. s 1257 against fragmenting and prolonging 
litigation and against piecemeal reviews of state court judgments does not prohibit our holding the 
decision of the Georgia Supreme Court to be a final judgment, particularly when postponing review 
would seriously erode the national labor policy requiring the subject matter of respondents’ cause to be 
heard by the National Labor Relations Board, not by the state courts.”).
99. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 167–68 (1974). See also, Anderson, supra note 
61, at 551–53.
100. Eisen, 417 U.S. at 172.
101. Anderson, supra note 61, at 555.
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cated that the third element was unnecessary and that conclusiveness and 
separability alone were sufficient.102
After several years, the Court reaffirmed the three elements of the col-
lateral order doctrine in Abney, but it restated the unreviewability prong.103
This revision required only that a ruling involve “an important right which 
would be ‘lost, probably irreparably,’ if review had to await final judg-
ment.”104 In contrast to Cohen’s standard that delay must prevent any re-
view at all, this rephrasing appeared to permit appeal where delay would 
damage some important rights, even though review remained possible.
In Abney, that important right was a right not to be tried. As men-
tioned above, the lower court in that case rejected the defendants’ double 
jeopardy claim.105 The Supreme Court reasoned that the purpose of the 
Double Jeopardy Clause was to prevent “the personal strain, public embar-
rassment, and expense of a criminal trial more than once for the same of-
fense.”106 If convicted, the issue would not be completely moot because the 
defendants could then appeal and possibly have the convictions overturned, 
but they would have lost the very right that the clause was designed to pro-
tect.107
This change dramatically increased the pool of orders potentially ap-
pealable as collateral orders. Perhaps aware of this, the Court quickly dou-
bled back in two cases that soon followed. In U.S. v. MacDonald, the 
defendant moved to dismiss an indictment for murder charges on the 
grounds of denial of his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial.108 In
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, the petitioner sought review of an 
order denying disqualification of opposing counsel for a conflict of inter-
est.109 In both cases, the Court found that the petitioners would still have an 
opportunity for meaningful review because the issues could be reviewed 
after trial and judgment could be vacated if prejudicial error was found.110
In these cases, the Court indicated that the burden of defending litiga-
tion, by itself, is not a sufficiently important right to justify immediate ap-
peal. A right not to be tried is sufficient only when it is central to the claim 
102. Id.
103. Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651 (1977).
104. Id. at 658 (quoting Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp. 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949)). 
105. Id. at 655.
106. Id. at 661.
107. Id. at 662.
108. United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850, 850 (1978).
109. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 369 (1981).
110. Id. at 377–78; see MacDonald, 435 U.S. at 860–61.
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denied by the order, as it was with the double jeopardy clause in Abney.111
As the MacDonald Court described speedy trial claims, “it is the delay 
before trial, not the trial itself, that offends against the constitutional guar-
antee . . . .”112 Likewise, orders refusing to disqualify counsel offend no 
similar right to evade trial.113
In Mitchell, expansion of the doctrine reached its apex when the Court 
added qualified immunity claims to the list of immediately appealable col-
lateral orders.114 In that case, Attorney General John Mitchell authorized a 
warrantless wiretap while investigating a domestic national security 
threat.115 The wiretap recorded three conversations involving Keith For-
syth, who then sued Mitchell for money damages after an unrelated but 
timely decision ruled such wiretaps illegal. Mitchell asserted partly that 
qualified immunity entitled him to immunity from suit.116
The Mitchell Court reasoned that like assertions of double jeopardy, 
the issue could be reviewed after final judgment, but an essential purpose 
of the qualified immunity defense is to guard officials from the litigation 
itself.117 The Court explained that qualified immunity is more than just a 
shield from liability; its purpose is to allow government officials to reason-
ably make decisions and take action “with independence and without fear 
of consequences.”118 Those consequences included subjecting officials to 
the costs and distractions of litigation.119 With this reasoning, the Court 
reaffirmed its position that immediate appeal is appropriate where rights 
central to the claim are jeopardized, even though review and eventual re-
versal is possible after final decision.
Initiating the doctrine’s retrenchment era, the Court changed course 
two years later and denied immediate appeal despite its conclusion that 
important rights would be irretrievably lost in Stringfellow v. Concerned 
Neighbors in Action.120 The petitioners in Stringfellow sought to intervene 
in litigation brought by both state and federal government involving haz-
111. MacDonald, 435 U.S. at 861 (“Unlike the protection afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clause, 
the Speedy Trial Clause does not, either on its face or according to the decisions of this Court, encom-
pass a ‘right not to be tried’ which must be upheld prior to trial if it is to be enjoyed at all.”).
112. Id.
113. Firestone, 449 U.S. at 376.
114. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985). 
115. Id. at 513.
116. Id. at 515–16.
117. Id. at 525–26.
118. Id. at 525 (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 819 (1982)).
119. Id. at 525–26.
120. Stringfellow v. Concerned Neighbors in Action, 480 U.S. 370 (1987).
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ardous waste disposal near their homes.121 The district court denied the 
petitioners intervention as of right, but granted them permissive interven-
tion subject to several restrictive conditions, including disallowance of 
damage claims.122 The petitioners argued that any appeal of their denial to 
intervene as of right would be futile after a final decision because an appel-
late court would almost certainly decline to invalidate such a complex case 
“involving numerous parties and years of litigation.”123
The Stringfellow Court found this contention plausible, but irrele-
vant.124 It explained that any litigant faced with an adverse pre-trial order 
faces the same practical difficulties, and those difficulties do not justify 
further erosion of the final decision rule.125 Perhaps the Court intended to 
reserve the collateral order doctrine for instances where important rights 
are certain to be lost, rather than just overwhelmingly probable, yet the 
Court failed to distinguish the right to intervene from other rights where 
immediate appeal is allowed.
In two cases over the following two years, the Court further narrowed 
the doctrine’s mootness requirement by chipping away at the “right not to 
be tried” standard for immediate appeal used in Abney and Mitchell. In the 
first case, Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, Justice Marshall alluded to the 
Courts reason for changing course.126 He explained that any litigant with a 
meritorious pretrial claim for dismissal can reasonably assert that such 
claim entails a right not to stand trial.127 If it were to tolerate this, the Court 
would eviscerate the final decision rule because litigants can typically as-
sert some ground for dismissal in any case.128
Both cases appeared immediately appealable under the more expan-
sive Mitchell analysis. The petitioner in Van Cauwenberghe argued that his 
immunity from service of process as an extradited citizen encompassed a 
right not to be tried, like the Court held with qualified immunity in Mitch-
ell.129 The petitioner in the second case, Lauro Lines S.R.L. v. Chasser,
argued that its forum selection clause comprised a contractual right not to 
be tried, at least not in a jurisdiction other than the Italian tribunal specified 
121. Id. at 372.
122. Id. at 373.
123. Id. at 376.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 377.
126. Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 486 U.S. 517, 524 (1988).
127. Id.
128. Anderson, supra note 61, at 579. 
129. Van Cauwenberghe, 486 U.S. at 522–23; Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985).
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in the clause.130 The Court’s own precedent supported both petitioners’ 
contentions that their respective claims conferred a right not to stand tri-
al.131
Nevertheless, the Court held denial orders to be not immediately ap-
pealable in both situations. In Van Cauwenberghe, the Court concluded that 
the purpose of immunity from service of process in the case’s context was 
to ensure that the “receiving state does not abuse the extradition processes 
of the extraditing state,” not to protect the extradited person from the bur-
dens of trial.132 In Lauro Lines, the Court drew a distinction between a right 
not to be tried at all and a right not to be tried in a particular forum.133 Both
results seemed unlikely, given both the recent Mitchell decision and prece-
dent indicating a right to avoid trial as central to these specific issues.
Over the next two decades, the Court continued to gradually condense 
the collateral order doctrine. Its most recent decision in Mohawk Indus., 
Inc. v. Carpenter represents the Supreme Court’s narrowest stance on the 
doctrine since its genesis in Cohen.134 In Mohawk, the petitioner sought 
immediate appeal of the trial court’s denial of his privilege claim and or-
dered that he disclose attorney-client communications.135 In recognition of 
the seriousness of its ruling, the trial court issued a stay so that the petition-
er could explore possible avenues to appeal, including the collateral order 
doctrine.136
In its analysis of whether effective review would be possible after tri-
al, the Court regressed from its standard that an important right must be 
injured or lost. Rather, the Court assessed whether the interest was so im-
periled by delay that it justified allowing immediate appeal for the entire 
class of orders—an analysis which would mean undermining both adminis-
trative efficiency and the independence and authority of district court judg-
es.137
On one hand, the Court recognized the importance of the attorney-
client privilege and its purpose of encouraging candor between clients and
130. Lauro Lines S.R.L. v. Chasser, 490 U.S. 495, 500 (1989).
131. Anderson, supra note 61, at 578 (explaining that the Court’s leading precedent on the issue at 
that time held that an extradited foreign citizen’s immunity from service conferred “the right to be tried 
only for the offense upon which extradition was based, and no others”); Id. at 584–85 (explaining that 
the Court’s leading precedent supported the argument that forum selection clauses confer a contractual 
right not to stand trial that would be destroyed by postponement until after trial).
132. Van Cauwenberghe, 486 U.S. at 525.
133. Lauro Lines, 490 U.S. at 501.
134. Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 100 (2009).
135. Id. at 104–05.
136. Id. 
137. Id. at 107; 108–09.
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counsel. On the other, litigants faced with adverse pre-trial privilege rulings 
have several remedial options, such as post-judgment appeal with the pos-
sibility of receiving a new trial with an order to exclude privileged material 
from evidence, a petition to the appeals court for a writ of mandamus, or 
defiance of the order followed by appeal of either the sanctions or the con-
tempt ruling.138 Because it found these alternatives sufficient, the Court 
concluded that the benefits of allowing collateral order appeal did not justi-
fy the institutional burdens.139
As with the doctrine’s other requirements, the Court’s guidance re-
garding unreviewability has, with each subsequent case, accumulated into a 
complicated and confusing morass. Post-Mohawk, the requirement remains 
satisfied where post-judgment appeal is indeed moot. If appeal is not moot-
ed, the requirement is nonetheless satisfied where delay compromises an 
important right, such as a right not to stand trial. Even where an important 
right will be lost post-judgment, the requirement is not satisfied if the insti-
tutional costs of expanding the doctrine are not justified.
Mohawk was also significant because the Court suggested a preference 
for using its authority under the Rules Enabling Act—rather than by judi-
cial decision—to expand the class of collaterally appealable orders.140 In
fact, Justice Thomas opined in his concurrence that this preference for 
rulemaking should be the Court’s holding rather than dicta.141
C. Rulemaking as an Alternative
Pursuant to the Rules Enabling Act of 1934,142 the Supreme Court has 
long had the authority to promulgate rules of procedure.143 The final deci-
sion rule, however, is federal law,144 and although the Court may interpret a 
federal statute—as it did in Cohen—it generally cannot make formal altera-
tions or amendments. Therefore, the Court previously could not extend 
appellate jurisdiction beyond what Congress had previously authorized. But 
in 1990, the congressionally commissioned Federal Courts Study Commit-
tee filed a report recommending that Congress grant the Court such pow-
er.145
138. Id. at 109–11.
139. Id. at 112.
140. Id. at 114.
141. Id. at 118–19 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
142. Act of June 19, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.
§ 2072 (1982)).
143. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071–2077 (2006).
144. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2011); 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (2011).
145. Report, supra note 9.
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found the orders conclusive, on the other hand, offered little explanation as 
to why; the Fifth Circuit noted only that “if a defendant after denial of the 
motion chooses to go forward with his claim, he must do so without the 
assistance of appointed counsel.”160 Perhaps these courts, like the Fifth 
Circuit, reached this conclusion because denial of appointed counsel so 
often causes litigants to abandon their claims or settle prematurely, and 
thus, subsequent review of these rulings is unlikely.161
Second, courts that found separability unsatisfied argued that these or-
ders typically require consideration of the merits and complexity of the 
claim.162 In contrast, the Federal Circuit reasoned that such a determination 
is neither a step toward final judgment on the merits, nor does it “enmesh” 
the court in such issues (despite the denial of counsel potentially affecting
the litigant’s ability to proceed on his claim).163 For this requirement, courts 
have generally agreed that consideration of the merits is necessary to dis-
pose of the order, but have diverged on whether this is significant.
Third, a majority of circuits have concluded that the issue remains re-
viewable after final judgment.164 These courts argued for a stricter, moot-
ness-based interpretation, and commonly analogized to both Flanagan v. 
United States and Firestone.165 In both cases, the Supreme Court consid-
ered collateral order appeal of rulings on the disqualification of counsel and 
found post-judgment review remained effective because the remedy of a 
new trial is sufficient, which is available upon a successful appeal of an 
erroneous denial order.166
The Fifth, Eighth, and Federal Circuits, however, found that delay 
would impose intolerable burdens upon plaintiffs, because it would likely 
strip civil pro se litigants of their ability to both effectively prosecute their 
claim and successfully appeal their denial of appointed counsel.167 As the 
Federal Circuit noted, so long as the petitioner’s case was presented rea-
sonably, an appellate court is unlikely to find denial of counsel prejudicial, 
ing the issue because the magistrate denied the motion without prejudice and therefore could later 
reconsider). 
160. Robbins v. Maggio, 750 F.2d 405, 412 (5th Cir. 1985).
161. Id. at 412–13 (“Indeed, there remains a great risk that a civil rights plaintiff may abandon a 
claim or accept an unreasonable settlement in light of his own perceived inability to proceed with the 
merits of his case, resulting in the loss of vital civil rights claims.”).
162. E.g., Holt v. Ford, 862 F.2d 850, 853 (11th Cir. 1989).
163. Lariscey v. U. S., 861 F.2d 1267, 1269–71 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
164. See supra note 157.
165. E.g., Holt v. Ford, 862 F.2d 850, 853–54 (11th Cir. 1989).
166. See Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259, 266–67 (1984); Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. 
Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 377–78 (1981).
167. See Lariscey v. U.S., 861 F.2d 1267, 1270 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Robbins v. Maggio, 750 F.2d 
405, 413 (5th Cir. 1985); Slaughter v. City of Maplewood, 731 F.2d 587, 589 (8th Cir. 1984).
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and “may never know whether a different or better case could have been 
presented that would have turned the tide in the indigent litigant’s fa-
vor.”168
B. Denials of Parker Immunity
The circuits also diverge on whether immediate appeal is appropriate 
for denials of a defendant’s motion to dismiss that asserts state action im-
munity in antitrust litigation, also called Parker immunity. In Parker v. 
Brown, the Supreme Court held that Sherman Antitrust Act prohibitions on 
anticompetitive activities do not apply to the conduct of a state or its 
agents.169
For example, both parties in Auraria Student Hous. at the Regency, 
LLC v. Campus Vill. Apartments, LLC operated individual apartment com-
plexes near the University of Colorado.170 Plaintiff Auraria Student Hous-
ing at the Regency (Auraria) claimed that Defendant Campus Village 
Apartments (Campus Village) illegally conspired to monopolize student 
housing in violation of Sherman Act prohibitions through its agreement 
with the university.171 This agreement required that most students reside in 
the Campus Village apartments for their first two semesters of enroll-
ment.172
Campus Village moved to dismiss and argued that the agreement was 
not subject to Sherman Act prohibitions because it was authorized, or at 
least a foreseeable result, of both state legislation and a clear state policy to 
displace competition with those regulations.173 The district court disagreed 
and denied Campus Village’s motion.174 Campus Village immediately ap-
pealed, but the Tenth Circuit declined jurisdiction under the collateral order 
doctrine.175
The federal circuits are currently split on the issues of whether the de-
nial of Parker immunity is immediately appealable by both private parties 
such as Campus Village and state actors.176 The split regarding private 
168. Lariscey, 861 F.2d at 1270.
169. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
170. Auraria Student Hous. at the Regency, LLC v. Campus Vill. Apartments, LLC, 703 F.3d 1147 
(10th Cir. 2013).
171. Id. at 1149.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 1149–50.
175. Id.; Id. at 1153.
176. See generally, Jason Kornmehl, State Action on Appeal: Parker Immunity and the Collateral 
Order Doctrine in Antitrust Litigation, 39 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1 (2015).
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A court does not need to examine whether an antitrust violation occurred to 
determine whether a government entity that is part of the state qualifies for 
immunity from such claims. Thus, courts have generally agreed that these 
orders satisfy the first two elements of the Coopers & Lybrand test.
For the third prong, the threshold question is whether a denial of Par-
ker immunity confers a “right not to be tried.”186 As discussed above, a 
party entitled to avoid the costs and burdens of litigation cannot adequately 
vindicate that right after the litigation has concluded. Thus, courts that 
found this element satisfied have held that Parker immunity indeed pro-
vides immunity from trial.187
In contrast, courts that have disallowed collateral order appeal because 
of this element have found that Parker immunity is merely a defense to 
liability.188 For this class of orders, the split regarding unreviewability is 
unique in that the courts agree about the proper application of the Coopers
& Lybrand test. If Parker immunity confers a right to evade trial, immedi-
ate appeal is appropriate. Rather, the issue is whether this immunity confers 
that right.
C. Temporary Reinstatement Orders for Miners Bringing Claims Un-
der the Mine Safety and Health Act
More recently in 2014, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals split from 
the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits, and from a later decision by the D.C. 
Circuit in 2016, with its decision in Cobra Natural Res., LLC v. Fed. Mine 
Safety & Health Review Comm’n.189 In that case, Respondent Russel Ratliff 
alleged that Petitioner Cobra Natural Resources, LLC unlawfully retaliated 
and fired him from his job as a coal miner after he voiced safety concerns 
regarding mining operations.190 An administrative law judge determined 
that Ratliff was entitled to temporary reinstatement to work while his claim 
186. Kornmehl, supra note 176, at 14; Acoustic Sys., Inc. v. Wenger Corp., 207 F.3d 287, 292 (5th 
Cir. 2000) (“[W]hen we assess whether interlocutory review is appropriate, ‘[t]he critical question . . . is 
whether the essence of the claimed right is a right not to stand trial.’ “ (quoting Van Cauwenberghe v. 
Biard, 486 U.S. 517, 524 (1988)).
187. E.g., Martin v. Mem’l Hosp. at Gulfport, 86 F.3d 1391, 1395 (5th Cir. 1996) (“We conclude 
that Parker v. Brown state action immunity shares the essential element of absolute, qualified and
Eleventh Amendment immunities—’an entitlement not to stand trial under certain circumstances.’”
(quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 525 (1985)).
188. See, e.g., S. Carolina State Bd. of Dentistry v. F.T.C., 455 F.3d 436, 445–47 (4th Cir. 2006) 
(rejecting arguments that state action antitrust doctrine provides immunity from suit).
189. Cobra Natural Res., LLC v. Fed. Mine Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 742 F.3d 82 (4th 
Cir. 2014).
190. See id. at 83–84.
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was pending and the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission 
(“FMSHRC”) affirmed that determination.191
If Cobra waited until the court entered final judgment to appeal the re-
instatement order, the issue would be entirely moot. Cobra would be unable 
to recover the wages and benefits Ratliff earned during that period even if 
the appeals court found reversible error. At that point, the mine operator 
must sustain both the economic loss and any damage from personnel issues 
arising from its employment of an unwelcome worker. Cobra thus sought 
interlocutory review of the FMSHRC order under the collateral order doc-
trine.192 The Fourth Circuit declined appellate jurisdiction, finding none of 
the Coopers and Lybrand Factors satisfied.193
The Fourth Circuit held that the reinstatement ruling was not a conclu-
sive determination because a mine operator can seek modification of the 
order based on “a change of circumstances,” such as a major layoff or mine 
shutdown.194 Alternatively, the Eleventh and D.C. Circuits both reasoned 
that the order was conclusive because the mine operator was left with no 
further recourse to avoid the Commission’s order at the agency level.195
Moreover, the D.C. Circuit argued that there was no basis to suspect that 
the commission contemplated reconsideration of the order.196 The Seventh 
Circuit found such an order conclusive as well, but offered no explana-
tion.197
In terms of separability, the Fourth Circuit found that the question pre-
sented by a review of the order would not be sufficiently distinct from the 
merits of the case.198 To obtain temporary reinstatement, the worker must 
demonstrate that his claim is “non-frivolous” by showing “protected activi-
ty, adverse action, and a nexus between the two.”199 The court reasoned 
that the factual and legal considerations of the discrimination claim were 
“deeply enmeshed” with initial considerations necessary to determine 
whether the claim was non-frivolous.200
191. Id. at 85.
192. Id. at 83. 
193. See id. at 88–92.
194. Id. at 89.
195. CalPortland Co., Inc. v. Fed. Mine Safety & Health Review Comm’n on Behalf of Pappas, 
No. 16-1094, 2016 WL 6123899, at *4 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 20, 2016); Jim Walter Res., Inc. v. Fed. Mine 
Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 920 F.2d 738, 744 (11th Cir. 1990).
196. CalPortland, 2016 WL 6123899, at *4.
197. Vulcan Const. Materials, L.P. v. Fed. Mine Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 700 F.3d 297, 
300 (7th Cir. 2012).
198. Cobra, 742 F.3d. at 90.
199. Id.
200. Id.
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In contrast, the D.C., Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits found the issues 
separable, but for different reasons. For the Seventh Circuit case, the ruling 
at issue was not a grant of reinstatement; rather, it was a denial of a motion 
to dissolve an existing reinstatement.201 As such, the determinative issue on 
appeal was that of statutory interpretation rather than one of whether the 
miner sufficiently presented prima facie evidence of discrimination.202
Accordingly, the issue was clearly separable from the merits of the discrim-
ination claim.203 The Eleventh Circuit found separability because the factu-
al and legal considerations involved were “conceptually distinct” from the 
merits.204 Alternatively, the D.C. Circuit found conclusiveness because the 
reinstatement order resolved no issue necessary for determination of the 
merits.205
For the last element, the Fourth Circuit concurred with the Seventh, 
Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits that a mine operator such as Cobra would in-
deed lose any opportunity for recovery if forced to delay its appeal until 
after final judgment, but it concluded that Cobra’s losses were not suffi-
ciently important.206 The court determined that the financial concerns at 
stake in the case, being “primarily economic,” failed to approach the im-
portance of other orders the Supreme Court found insufficient in this re-
gard.207
D. Orders Disposing of Special Motions to Strike under Anti-SLAPP 
Statutes
The most recent federal circuit split addressing collateral order appeals 
emerged in early 2016 with the Second Circuit’s decision in Ernst v. Carri-
gan.208 In that case, the Second Circuit declined to follow previous rulings 
regarding immediate appealability of resolutions of motions to strike under 
the various anti-SLAPP statutes by both the Fifth and Ninth Circuits.209
SLAPP is an acronym for Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participa-
tion.210 Anti-SLAPP statutes provide for early dismissal of meritless law-
201. Vulcan, 700 F.3d at 299.
202. Id. at 300.
203. See id.
204. Jim Walter Res., 920 F.2d at 744.
205. CalPortland, 2016 WL 6123899, at *5.
206. Cobra Natural Res., LLC v. Fed. Mine Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 742 F.3d 82, 91–92
(4th Cir. 2014).
207. Id. at 92.
208. Ernst v. Carrigan, 814 F.3d 116 (2d Cir. 2016).
209. Id. at 120-21.
210. Id. at 117.
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suits filed primarily to suppress the exercise of valid political expression by 
burdening the defendant with costly, time-consuming litigation.211 In Ernst,
the applicable Vermont anti-SLAPP statute provides for dismissal where 
defendants can show that the case arises from their “exercise of ‘the right to 
freedom of speech or to petition the government’ [sic] and that the speech 
or petition is ‘in connection with a public issue.”212 If successful in this 
showing, the burden shifts to plaintiffs to show both that the defendant’s 
conduct at issue lacked either reasonable factual support or any arguable 
basis in law, and that such conduct caused them actual injury.213
The conduct at issue in Ernst was the defendants’ alleged writing and 
circulation of a letter regarding their neighbors with whom they had en-
gaged in multiple zoning disputes, Barbara Ernst and Barbara Supeno.214
The letter contained information supposedly showing that Ms. Ernst and 
Ms. Supeno routinely falsified information, used harassment, lied, distorted 
facts, and used the court system for extortion.215 The defendants also alleg-
edly made defamatory statements during a public meeting and sent a letter 
to Ms. Ernst and Ms. Supeno’s lawyer that implied the plaintiffs would not 
pay him for his services.216
In response, Ms. Ernst and Ms. Supeno sued in state court alleging 
defamation, false-light invasion of privacy, and tortious interference 
against the defendants.217 After successfully removing the case to federal 
court, the defendants filed special motions to strike the claims against them 
under Vermont’s anti-SLAPP statute.218 The district court granted the mo-
tions to strike two of the allegations and denied the motions for the remain-
ing two.219 The district court declined to certify the opinion for 
interlocutory appeal, and both parties cross-appealed.220
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals declined to grant appellate juris-
diction because the orders at issue failed to satisfy the separability require-
ment of the collateral order doctrine.221 The court determined that the anti-
SLAPP statute’s requisite examinations of both whether the defendant’s 
211. Id.
212. Id. at 119.
213. Id.







221. Id. at 119.
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conduct had factual support or basis in law, and whether the conduct 
caused injury, were intertwined with the merits of the action.222
For example, the court explained that to decide the anti-SLAPP mo-
tion, the district court had to examine the parties’ filings and accompanying 
affidavits to determine whether the alleged statements were “devoid of 
reasonable factual support.”223 Similarly, the court must find that the state-
ments were false for Ms. Ernst and Ms. Supeno to be successful on the 
merits of their defamation claim.224 The court found these two inquiries to
be neither “completely separate” nor “conceptually distinct.”225 In contrast, 
the Fifth and Ninth Circuits found them separable primarily because a court 
must satisfy a lower standard to resolve an anti-SLAPP motion than it does 
to resolve the claim, namely, whether the plaintiff’s claim merely has mer-
it, not whether it will succeed.226
The Second Circuit also dismissed the argument that failure to satisfy 
the separability prong should not preclude the immediate review of anti-
SLAPP statutes because they provide an immunity from trial.227 The court 
explained that although denials of a claim of an immunity from trial, such 
as a qualified immunity claim, can be immediately appealed “even though 
part of the traditional inquiry touches on the merits,” such overlap must 
involve only the determination of a question of law.228 Even in the qualified 
immunity context, a fact-related dispute is not immediately appealable.229
Similarly, anti-SLAPP determinations turn on a fact-based inquiry re-
garding the factual support of the alleged conduct, and therefore the court 
found them not truly separable from the claim.230 Thus, the Second Circuit 
concluded that even if the anti-SLAPP statute did provide a substantive 
immunity from trial as the Fifth and Ninth Circuits found,231 resolutions of 
these motions should not be immediately appealable.232
222. Id. at 119-20.
223. Id. at 120.
224. Id.
225. See Id. at 120-21.
226. Henry v. Lake Charles Am. Press, L.L.C., 566 F.3d 164, 174-75 (5th Cir. 2009); Batzel v. 
Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1025 (9th Cir. 2003).
227. Ernst, 814 F.3d at 121.
228. Id. at 121-22.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 122.
231. Henry, 566 F.3d at 177; Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1025.
232. Ernst, 814 F.3d at 121-22.
2017] THE COLLATERAL ORDER DOCTRINE 647
IV. REDEFINING THE REQUIREMENTS FOR COLLATERAL ORDER
APPEAL
The collateral order doctrine has become one of the most complex and 
unpredictable issues in civil procedure. As outlined above, the Supreme 
Court has expanded and contracted the Cohen interpretation of § 1291 fi-
nality over the years, and has left a trail of confusing, and, at times, contra-
dictory guidance. These decisions have led to a patchwork of inconsistent 
outcomes in the lower courts. This section proposes a two-step solution: 
first, the Court should use its authority to redefine § 1291 finality using a 
strict, narrow interpretation of Cohen’s requirements; second, the Court 
should use its § 1292(e) authority to provide for appeal of non-final rulings 
as a safety valve, where policy interests favor immediate appeal.
Professor Lloyd C. Anderson argued that one potential remedy would 
be for the Court to use its rulemaking authority to create a rule authorizing 
appeal as of right from prejudgment orders only where it: “(1) conclusively 
determines an issue; (2) the issue is completely separate from the merits; 
and (3) the order would be unreviewable at all after final judgment because 
the issue would be moot.”233 He noted that during the doctrine’s initial era, 
when these requirements were strictly construed, the Supreme Court need-
ed to review collateral order issues only once every six years.234 In contrast, 
the Court reviewed the issue once for every year during its expansionary 
era from 1974 to 1988.235 As Anderson argues, this is evidently a result of 
the Court’s “own loosening of jurisdictional standards.”236
Redefining the requirements for collateral orders in these terms would 
provide further limitations that keep the doctrine “narrow, and selective in 
its membership,” as the Court has repeatedly advocated.237 It would also 
preserve appellate jurisdiction for several classes of orders already deemed 
eligible and maintains the collateral order framework for future classes of 
orders. Further development is necessary, however, for each of these re-
quirements.
First, Anderson failed to address the difficulties courts have had de-
termining whether an order is conclusive. The revised definition of finality 
should clarify that a conclusive order is one where the adversely affected 
litigant can take no further steps to avoid the effects of the order. As the 
233. Anderson, supra note 61, at 607.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 581.
236. Id.
237. Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 113 (2009) (quoting Will v. Hallock, 546 
U.S. 345, 350 (2006)).
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Fourth, strict unreviewability should require that delayed review be 
impossible because the issue is mooted. Where review remains possible, 
this requirement would not be satisfied, even where a litigant suffers some 
cost or loses some attendant rights upon delay. For example, an order deny-
ing a police officer’s qualified immunity defense would remain reviewable 
even though he could never vindicate his right to evade trial. This is be-
cause he would still be able to assert the immunity as a defense to liability 
on appeal, and if vindicated, the judgment could be overturned.
A rule that incorporates these requirements would look something like 
this: Final decisions for purposes of appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 
include interlocutory decisions that 1) leave no further steps the litigant can 
take to vindicate the claim of right before final judgment; 2) resolve no 
issue that must be determined to dispose of the litigation; and 3) are mooted 
post-judgment. This revised definition resolves current ambiguities and 
provides clear rules for lower courts to apply, but it would overrule many 
classes of orders previously held appealable as of right.
For policy reasons, some of these newly excluded classes of orders 
should be immediately appealable. In these instances, Anderson suggested 
that litigants seek discretionary appeal under § 1292(b) or file a mandamus 
action under § 1361.243 Although these options remain viable, both can be 
exceedingly difficult paths for litigants seeking an appeal.244 A better ap-
proach would be for the Court to again use its § 1292(e) authority to pro-
vide a codified path for appeal of those non-final rulings.
The class of orders that would most benefit from this type of rulemak-
ing are denials of governmental immunity claims. This proposed definition 
would overrule entire lines of such cases, including those that allowed for 
immediate appeal from rejections of a president’s claim of absolute im-
munity,245 a government official’s claim of qualified immunity,246 and a 
243. Anderson, supra note 61, at 608.
244. Tory Weigand, Discretionary Interlocutory Appeals Under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b): A First 
Circuit Survey and Review, 19 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 183 (2014) (“There is a concern that 
[1292(b)] is under-utilized, unduly limited to ‘exceptional case[s]’ or to large complex cases, and 
otherwise hobbled by allowing trial judges, with unreviewable discretion and ‘vested interests,’ to serve 
as gatekeepers of appellate review.”); Anderson, supra note 61, at 543 (“Mandamus actions, however, 
are limited to exceptional circumstances in which a district court has exceeded the scope of its authority 
or has so manifestly abused its discretion that it has, in effect, ignored the rules.”).
245. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982) (permitting immediate appeal from denial of U.S. 
President’s claim of absolute immunity).
246. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 536 (1985) (permitting immediate appeal from denial of 
Attorney General’s claim of qualified immunity). 
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state actor’s claim of Parker immunity.247 These immunities, and the pro-
tections they provide from litigation, further important interests as the court 
has repeatedly recognized.248 To preserve these interests, the Court should 
promulgate a rule providing for appeal as of right from denials of govern-
mentally asserted immunities.
Going forward, this new framework for collateral order appeals would 
resolve the remaining circuit splits without the need for individual review. 
For denials of appointed counsel in civil cases, the new requirements would 
overrule the three circuits that allow immediate appeal because these orders 
would remain reviewable after final judgment. Indeed, this may prove 
harsh for litigants in civil rights cases as some commentators and judges 
have noted, especially where important statutory or constitutional rights are 
at stake.249 Cases such as these, however, also present instances where im-
portant policy interests could motivate the Court to use its § 1292(e) rule-
making authority to carve a path for appeal.
In contrast, orders granting temporary reinstatement of miners bring-
ing complaints against their employers would fall into the narrow category 
of orders appealable under the doctrine. The orders satisfy the conclusive-
ness requirement because there are no further steps the mine operator can 
take to avoid reinstatement. Although the orders may be revised due to a 
change in circumstances, those circumstances lie outside the mine opera-
tor’s control. As noted, every federal circuit to consider the issue agreed 
that it would also be moot post-judgment.250
The remaining requirement, separability, is satisfied for these orders 
as well. As discussed above, a miner must demonstrate that his claim was 
non-frivolous to obtain temporary reinstatement.251 To do so, he must pro-
vide evidence of protected activity, adverse action, and a nexus between the 
two,252 elements he must also prove to succeed on the merits. But the miner 
must satisfy a lower standard for purposes of the reinstatement order: that 
247. E.g., Praxair, Inc. v. Florida Power & Light Co., 64 F.3d 609, 611 (11th Cir. 1995) (permit-
ting immediate appeal from denial of electric utility company’s claim of Parker immunity from anti-
trust liability).
248. E.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 819 (1982) (“[W]here an official’s duties legitimate-
ly require action in which clearly established rights are not implicated, the public interest may be better 
served by action taken ‘with independence and without fear of consequences.’”).
249. See Feldman, supra note 157, at 1740.
250. See supra note 206–207 and accompanying text. 
251. See supra note 199 and accompanying text.
252. Id.
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his claim is merely non-frivolous.253 In doing so, the Commission resolves 
no issue that needs to be determined to prevail on the merits. Accordingly, 
the Commission’s determination makes no step toward final judgment, and 
immediate appeal does not risk duplicative review.
Similarly, this framework confirms separability for resolutions of anti-
SLAPP motions to strike because the fact-based inquiry required involves a 
lower standard. Again, these statutes require a court to confirm that the 
claim is non-frivolous by examining whether challenged conduct is devoid 
of reasonable factual support or whether the plaintiff can establish a proba-
bility of success for his claim.254 Neither of these requirements, however, is 
sufficient to succeed on the merits, which requires, for example, a determi-
nation that challenged assertions are indeed false.255 Thus, such preliminary 
inquiries fail to resolve any issue that is central to the claim.
V. CONCLUSION
The collateral order exception to the final judgment rule functions 
most efficiently as a narrow mechanism with requirements that, when satis-
fied, adequately balance the institutional burdens of increased appellate 
caseloads with the benefits of mitigating unduly harsh consequences for 
litigants. The U.S. Supreme Court has, however, gradually stretched these 
requirements, albeit often to further important policy interests. In doing so, 
the Court has left complex and confusing guidance that has made interpre-
tation difficult and has significantly increased procedural litigation. A re-
vised definition of finality that both returns to a narrow interpretation of 
Cohen’s requirements and resolves potential ambiguities, alongside further 
Supreme Court rulemaking, would return Cohen’s collateral order doctrine 
to a workable standard, resolve current conflicts, and avoid the institutional 
costs of addressing the issue through fragmentary litigation.
253. Cobra Nat. Res., LLC v. Fed. Mine Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 742 F.3d 82, 90 (4th 
Cir. 2014) (explaining that an analysis of an application for temporary reinstatement involves a more 
lenient standard than that which the litigant must undertake following a full hearing on the merits). 
254. E.g., Ernst v. Carrigan, 814 F.3d 116, 120 (2d Cir. 2016); Henry v. Lake Charles Am. Press, 
L.L.C., 566 F.3d 164, 170 (5th Cir. 2009).
255. E.g., Ernst, 814 F.3d at 120.

